Nigeria’s current security situation is best described as VUCA — volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous — posing profound questions for policymakers and citizens alike. Repeated calls by senior security figures, including DSS Director-General Tosin Ajayi, former Defence Minister Bashir Magashi, and General TY Danjuma, for Nigerians to defend themselves rather than flee from armed threats, have reignited debate about the role of ordinary citizens in national security.
These are not ordinary Nigerians but people versed in the knowledge of security management and known to have brilliant ideas. Indeed, encouraging self-defence appears pragmatic. However, on close examination, it is also fraught with challenges in a society where local government systems have nearly collapsed, and traditional rulers lack formal roles.
Moreover, in Nigeria’s diverse context, where actions are often filtered through regional, ethnic, and religious lenses, the practicality of widespread self-defence is questionable. The absence of organised structures to support such initiatives risks deepening divisions and undermining social cohesion.
With the above in mind, their proposed solution has raised serious questions that are difficult to ignore. Magashi in one breath he called on Nigerians to stand up to the gunmen and defend themselves rather than flee. Then in another breath he opposed Nigerians’ demand to bear arms. Questions: if Nigerians do not have the right to bear arms how then do they defend themselves and stamp out violent extremism in their communities?
From where did the people of Bauchi State that Ajayi referenced in his call to arms, get the weapons that gave them superior advantage over Boko Haram, given that the government prohibits arms possession? And for Danjuma, how did he expect Nigerians to acquire the weapons to defend themselves?
Civilians in Nigeria have never been introduced to arms training. If bandits abduct and kill senior military officers and successfully down a military aircraft, how do ordinary Nigerians defend themselves? Do these calls not amount to an invitation for chaos if citizens disregard security agencies? Are we not creating new problems while trying to address the existing ones?
Notwithstanding these yet unanswered questions, these security leaders deserve credits for stimulating national discourse on community involvement in security. Their central message is clear: the military alone cannot resolve Nigeria’s security crisis. Communities must become more proactive in preventing and managing threats. The pressing question, then, is how communities can collaborate with authorities to disrupt these networks and what legal frameworks can support such participation.
Globally, empowering communities as the first line of defence is not unique to Nigeria. United Nations Security Council Resolutions and international best practices recognise that most security issues are local, involving unique causes and stakeholders. Communities worldwide play a critical role in identifying and reporting threats, but the emphasis is increasingly on preventive diplomacy and non-kinetic responses — such as trust-building, early warning, and social inclusion — rather than confrontation alone. Successful models prioritise reducing the capacity for violence through comprehensive, community-driven strategies.
Effective prevention includes addressing the root causes of conflict — governance deficits, poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion — while building trust between law enforcement and local communities. Training citizens to recognise threats and developing community-led emergency response plans are vital. Unfortunately, Nigeria has invested too little in these areas, leaving communities frustrated and reactive rather than proactive in managing insecurity.
Peacebuilding efforts that foster social cohesion and inclusive governance are often more sustainable and cost-effective than relying solely on state security forces. Such initiatives promote violence reduction, equitable resource management, and address inequalities through education, healthcare, and economic empowerment.
Communities, with their intimate local knowledge, are well-placed to identify threats early and respond quickly, especially when organised through neighbourhood watch schemes or community policing partnerships. These approaches have been shown to improve trust, reduce crime, and facilitate conflict resolution at the grassroots level.
However, Nigeria’s capacity for community conflict prevention and management is currently hampered by two major issues. First, traditional rulers — who historically own and understand their communities — are not constitutionally empowered, diminishing their ability to mediate disputes. Often, even minor conflicts are escalated to federal authorities, bypassing local solutions.
Second, the collapse of local government has created a vacuum, allowing non-state actors to fill governance roles, sometimes exacerbated by social media. In contrast, other countries invest in building local capacity for conflict management. In the 1990s, Nigeria benefited from substantial international support for such initiatives, but donor priorities have since shifted, and the complexity of Nigeria’s conflicts has made sustained impact difficult to achieve.
To build on these foundations, government should establish conflict desks in all local government councils to monitor early warning signs, mediate disputes, and provide negotiation services. Training local mediators would enhance peaceful conflict resolution. Critically, President Bola Tinubu’s administration must invest in local government autonomy and constitutionally empower traditional rulers.
Strengthening state and community policing initiatives is also essential. Ultimately, achieving sustainable peace in Nigeria will require inclusive dialogue, economic justice, robust institutions, and active youth engagement. By combining traditional methods with modern governance reforms, Nigeria can reduce violence and lay the groundwork for lasting peace.
